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THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Dan M. Kahan* 
THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST. By William Ian Miller. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1997. Pp. 320. $24.95. 
I. A CONCEPTUAL BLINDSPOT 
My goal in this review is to call attention to a defect in the domi­
nant theories of criminal law and to identify a resource for remedy­
ing it. The defect is the absence of a sophisticated account of how 
disgust does and should influence legal decisionmaking. The cor­
rective resource is William Miller's The Anatomy of Disgust.1 
To make my claims more vivid, consider two stories. Both in­
volve men who were moved to kill by disgust toward 
homosexuality. 
Stephen Roy Carr observed two female hikers in the woods and 
decided to follow them at a distance. That night, as the women 
were engaged in lovemaking at their secluded campsite, the armed 
Carr burst from his hiding place and shot them repeatedly, killing 
one and severely injuring the other.2 Carr maintained at trial that 
"the 'show' put on by the women, including their nakedness, their 
hugging and kissing and their oral sex," had filled him with over­
powering revulsion.3 In support of this defense - which he offered 
to mitigate the charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter4 -
Carr proffered psychiatric evidence relating to his rejection by his 
mother, whom he suspected of being a lesbian, and by other 
women.5 After the judge refused to admit this evidence, Carr was 
convicted of first-degree murder.6 The Pennsylvania Superior 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D. 
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Jack Goldsmith, Elizabeth Garrett, Richard Helm­
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Cass Sunstein, and Daniel Yeager for comments; to Jason Fliegel for research assistance; and 
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CLAUDIA BRENNER, EmIIT BULLETS: ONE WoMAN's STORY OF SURVIVING ANTI-GAY VIO­
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3. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364. 
4. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-65. 
5. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-64. 
6. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363-65. 
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Court affirmed.7 "[The law] does not recognize homosexual activ­
ity between two persons as legal provocation sufficient to reduce an 
unlawful killing ... from murder to voluntary manslaughter," the 
court concluded.8 "A reasonable person would simply have discon­
tinued his observation and left the scene .... "9 
Richard Lee Bernardski was convicted of a double murder.10 
Evidence at trial demonstrated that the eighteen-year-old Bernard­
ski and his friends had set out one evening to "pester the homosex­
uals. "11 They proceeded to a part of town known for its gay 
nightlife and accepted a ride from two gay men whom they met 
there.12 After the group drove to a remote spot in the woods, 
Bernardski ordered the gay men to strip.13 When they refused, 
Bernardski drew a pistol and opened fire, killing both.14 Unlike the 
judge in the Carr case, however, the judge who presided over 
Bernardski's trial expressed sympathy for Bernardski's revulsion. 
"I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level," the judge ex­
plained, "and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a 
prostitute."15 After all, he said, Bernardski's victims would not 
have been killed "if they hadn't been cruising the streets picking up 
teen-age boys "; "I don't much care for queers cruising the streets 
[picking up teen-age boys]. I've got a teen-age boy."16 The judge 
rejected the prosecution's recommendation of life imprisonment 
and instead sentenced Bernardski to a term in line with the ones 
imposed for persons convicted of voluntary manslaughter.17 
Which judge got it right - the one who refused to let Carr tell 
his story of disgust ; or the one who not only listened to Bernardski, 
but who mitigated the sentence because of his own disgust toward 
homosexuality? Can we possibly answer this question without 
some account of what disgust is? Maybe disgust consists, as Carr 
seemed to suggest, of an impulsive and unthinking revulsion toward 
its object. If so, then shouldn't the court have admitted Carr's psy­
chiatric evidence to determine whether his disgust had impaired his 
capacity for self-control and hence his moral responsibility for his 
7. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1367. 
8. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364-65. 
9. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364. 
10. See Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence For Killer of 2 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 1988, at 8; Judge ls Censured Over Remark on Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 
1989, at A28. 
11. Belkin, supra note 10 , at 8 (quoting testimony at trial). 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. See id. 
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behavior?18 If that's what disgust is and why it matters, shouldn't 
the judge who sentenced Bemardski have been less sympathetic -
both because Bemardski's attack was so clearly premeditated, and 
because the judge himself had a duty to rely on reason, rather than 
instinctive aversions, in fashioning an appropriate sentence? 
Or perhaps disgust embodies an evaluative appraisal that is it­
self susceptible of being evaluated as morally true or false.19 But in 
that case, we can again ask, who got it right - the court in Carr, 
when it labeled the defendant's disgust "unreasonable"; or the 
judge in Bernardski, when he allowed his own disgust to tell him 
that the defendant deserved mitigation for his? The conventional 
principles of homicide law don't supply answers to these questions, 
because those principles have nothing to say about the nature of 
disgust. 
This frustrating muteness generalizes. Many jurisdictions au­
thorize the death penalty for murders that are "outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" or the like.20 This formulation 
says, in effect, that capital sentencers - typically juries - should 
trust their own disgust sensibilities to identify which murderers de­
serve to die. But why should we have this much confidence in dis­
gust to discern what's just? 
Many judges now punish offenders with shaming penalties -
from bumper stickers for drunk drivers, to stigmatizing publicity for 
men convicted of soliciting prostitutes, to signs or even distinctive 
clothing for thieves.21 Shame and disgust are obviously related: 
those who are shamed predictably incur the diSgust of others and 
even of themselves (pp. 34, 80). Is the eliciting of disgust an appro­
priate or sensible aim of punishment? 
Finally, the law often treats disgust toward an activity- such as 
obscenity or sodomy - as sufficient to make it criminal. Is disgust 
by itself a legitimate ground for coercion? 
Miller's work, I will try to show, furnishes a solid theoretical 
foundation for addressing the role that judgments of and about dis­
gust play in the criminal law. Drawing on a rich variety of sources 
in psychology, history, literature, and philosophy, Miller paints a 
18. See Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections 
on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 753-56 (1995) (defending the use of the provocation defense in "homo­
sexual advance" cases on this ground). 
19. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 285-89 (1996) (describing the "evaluative conception" of 
emotion). 
20. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1997); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)(6) 
(1994) (authorizing the death penalty in "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" cases). 
21. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 
631-34 (1996) (discussing "the shaming alternative"). 
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vivid picture of disgust as "a moral and social sentiment" (p. 2). By 
"mark[ing] out moral matters for which we can have no compro­
mise" (p. 194), disgust, he convincingly argues, plays an indispensa­
ble role in our evaluative life. It plays just as important a role, 
moreover, in social life, "rank[ing] people and things in a kind of 
cosmic ordering" (p. 2), and thus supplying "the basis for honoring 
and respecting as well as for dishonoring and disrespecting" (p. 
202). These insights do not by themselves resolve all of the criminal 
law controversies in which disgust figures - a topic, sadly, about 
which Miller himself has little to say. But they do, I believe, help to 
reveal exactly what is at stake in these disputes, and why they take 
on the political salience that they typically do. 
Indeed, Miller's account can help us to see why, despite the per­
vasiveness-of judgments of and about disgust in criminal law, offi­
cial and academic criminal law theory has so little to say about it. 
Disgust, Miller shows us, is brazenly and uncompromisingly judg­
mental; the moral idiom of modem liberalism is not. Miller attrib­
utes the relatively peripheral role that disgust plays in this discourse 
to "[a] newer style of moralist, ... one for whom tolerance and 
respect for persons are fundamental virtues" and who therefore 
"wish[ es] our disgust sensitivities lowered so we would be less sus­
ceptible to finding difference and strangeness sources of disgust" (p. 
179). The dominant forms of normative theorizing in criminal law 
are no less averse to the kind of intolerant moralizing that disgust 
embodies. Miller argues that it's naYve for contemporary moral the­
orists to pretend that disgust doesn't influence moral judgments; I 
want to suggest that the willful blindness of criminal theorists to­
ward disgust is even worse than that. 
II. MILLER'S DISGUST 
Miller addresses disgust as part of an ongoing project to defend 
a style of social theorizing that "privileges the emotions in general 
and certain emotions in particular" (p. 21). This project has two 
adversaries: behaviorist forms of social science, which "try to ex­
plain most social action by reference to self-interest" and thus ig­
nore emotions altogether (p. x); and contemporary psychoanalysis, 
which "reduc[es emotions] to mere veneering on [some] underlying 
oedipal master narrative" (p. xii). In the place of these emotion­
inattentive accounts, Miller seeks to show that the contours of a 
community's emotional life "make possible social orderings of par­
ticular stripes," and that it therefore "behooves social and political 
theory to care about these emotions" (p. 18). The Anatomy of Dis-
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gust is the second installment in this project; the first was Miller's 
book Humiliation,22 and the next a forthcoming book on cowardice. 
Unlike the social scientists and psychoanalysts he attacks, Miller 
is a social constructivist.23 On this view, social norms and meanings 
determine the content of emotions, which in turn reinforce those 
norms and meanings.24 "Emotions," Miller contends, "are feelings 
linked to ways of talking about those feelings, to social and cultural 
paradigms that make sense of those feelings by giving us a basis for 
knowing when they are properly felt and properly displayed" (p. 8). 
This is so for "even the most visceral" emotions, such as disgust: 
Even when the source of disgust is our own body the interpretations 
we make of our bodily secretions and excretions are deeply embed­
ded in elaborate social and cultural systems of meaning. Feces, 
anuses, snot, saliva, hair, sweat, pus, the odors that emanate from our 
body and from those of others come with social and cultural histories 
attached to them. [p. 8] 
At the same time, emotions such as anger, humiliation, and disgust 
have "functions": they enable certain experiences and foreclose 
others, in much the way that language selectively enables thoughts; 
they supply powerful "motives for action," demarking some exper­
iences and objects as worthy of aspiration and others as not (pp. 8, 
18). For these reasons, emotions inevitably feed back into the 
norms and meanings that construct them, entrenching those phe­
nomena as the basis of a community's distinctive mode of social 
organization (p. 217). 
For Miller, disgust is constructed by norms of hierarchy. "Dis­
gust evaluates (negatively) what it touches, proclaim[ing] the mean­
ness and inferiority of its object" (p. 9). It is suffused, too, with 
"ideas of a particular kind of danger, the danger inherent in pollu­
tion and contamination, the danger of defilement" (p. 8). Accord­
ingly, we feel urgently constrained to remove or eliminate the 
offending object, or to cleanse ourselves after contact with it, lest it 
contaminate us and bring us down to its level. In this way, disgust 
"presents a nervous claim of right to be free of the dangers imposed 
by the proximity of the inferior. It is thus an assertion of a claim to 
superiority that at the same time recognizes the vulnerability of that 
superiority to the defiling powers of the low" (p. 9). 
This sensibility in turn constructs the hierarchies that give rise to 
it. At the level of perception, disgust naturally "ranks people and 
things" (p. 2). "[A]long with desire, [it] locates the bounds of the 
other, either as something to be avoided, repelled, or attacked, or, 
22. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION (1993). 
23. For a general account of this approach to emotions, see Claire Armon-Jones, The 
Thesis of Constructionism, in THE SocIAL CoNSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 32 (Rom Harre ed., 
1986). 
24. See id. at 33-34. 
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in other settings, as something to be emulated, imitated, or mar­
ried " (p. 50). It "build[s] ... moral and social community " by "sep­
arating our group from their group " (p. 194), by "prevent[ing] our 
way from being subsumed into their way " (p. 50). At the level of 
action, disgust is a powerful "motivator of discipline and social con­
trol " (p. 80). It impels us to steer clear of deviance, both to avoid 
the acute discomfort of being disgusted with ourselves, and to avoid 
the unpleasant consequences of being the object of the disgust of 
others. It likewise impels us to shun deviants, both to avoid their 
potentially contaminating influence, and to suppress the subversive 
claims to respect that their behavior embodies. "If you were casu­
ally to enumerate the norms and values, aesthetic and moral, whose 
breach prompts disgus�, you wou],d see just how crucial the emotion 
is to keeping us in line and minimally presentable " (p. 18). 
Of course, there is by no means universal agreement on what -
or who - is disgusting. Variation in disgust sensibilities across soci­
eties and across communities within a single society is another phe­
nomenon that Miller's social constructivist account is uniquely 
suited to explaining. '.'It is culture, not nature, that draws lines be­
tween defilement and purity, clean and filthy, those crucial bounda­
ries disgust is called on to police " (p. 15). Miller sounds a note of 
moderation on this score. Certainly, there are some things -
among them incest, excrement, and (according to Miller) menstrual 
blood - that virtually no society excludes from the disgust menu, 
perhaps for sociobiological reasons. Nevertheless, there is a signifi­
cant residuum of variation, especially on what to include, that must 
in the end be chalked up to the diversity of cultural norms (pp. 15-
16). 
In our day, we are accustomed not only to variance in percep­
tions of disgust, but also to political contention over them. To 
whose sensibilities should the law defer - the heterosexual soldiers 
who- are disgusted by the idea of sharing barracks with gays or op­
ponents of the gay-soldier ban who are disgusted by homophobia?2s 
With whom should we be disgusted - the National Endowment for 
the Arts for funding sacrilegious art or conservative congressmen 
for proposing to screen NBA grant applications for offensiveness?26 
25. Compare Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Chief Warns Clinton on Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 1993, at Al ("The Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by Gen. Colin L. Powell, contend that 
repealing the ban would wreck morale and discipline, undermine recruiting, [and] force de­
voutly religious service members to resign.") with 139 CoNo. REc. H9656 (Nov. 15, 1993) 
(remarks of Rep. Woolsey) (deriding tlie Pentagon's policy as "offensive" and "appall[ing]"). 
26. Compare Amei Wallach, The Funding Fight, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1989, §II, at 4 (re­
porting tlie controversy surrounding tlie NEA's funding of "Piss Christ," a crucifix sub­
merged in artist's urine) with Valerie Richardson, Helms' Photo in Urine at NEA-Funded 
Show, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1989, at Al (reporting the controversy surrounding the NEA's 
funding of "Piss Helms," a urine-submerged photograph of Sen. Jesse Helms, the sponsor of 
legislation to ban tlie funding of disgusting art). 
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Miller's account helps to explain these types of disagreements, too. 
Hierarchy not only constructs disgust; disgust also constructs norms 
of hierarchy. "[W]hat is being established or confirmed" when we 
experience it "is [the] relative social and moral value" of its object 
(p. 217). It's predictable, then, that the shifting content of disgust 
would spark contention, particularly in a pluralistic society. "In 
[the] hurly-burly of anxious competition for status," different 
groups aggressively market their favored conceptions of disgust 
"either to maintain rank already achieved, to test whether it ha[ s] 
been achieved, or to challenge for its acquisition" (p. 217). Miller 
sees this dynamic at work in challenges to "hierarchies based on 
race, ethnicity, gender, physical and mental handicap, sexual orien­
tation" and the like, movements that are concerned at least as much 
with securing "changes in the emotional economy" as they are with 
securing "equal rights" (p. 235). 
Miller develops this account of disgust across a series of topics 
as diverse as the methodologies and disciplines on which he draws. 
Early on in the book, he undertakes a rigorous philosophical analy­
sis aimed at distinguishing disgust from related emotions. Both fear 
and disgust, for example, make us crave distance from their objects, 
but fear is content merely to escape, whereas disgust "puts us to the 
burden of cleansing and purifying, a much more intensive and prob­
lematic labor" (p. 26). Indignation and disgust are both emotions 
of disapprobation, but whereas indignation tends to be "precise in 
its manner, focusing on particular wrongs" to the person experienc­
ing it, disgust "is a more generalizing moral sentiment casting blame 
on whole styles of behavior and personality traits" with an intensity 
that indignation rarely matches (pp. 35-36). 
The middle chapters present a revolting but riveting phenome­
nology of disgust. Here Miller catalogs the various things that dis­
gust us (bad breath, pubic hair, rotting food, masturbation, even 
laughter) as well as the diverse modes (oral, olfactory, anal) of tak-
ing the disgusting in. 
-
One of Miller's most compelling claims relates to intimacy, 
which, he argues, consists in the "suspension of certain important 
disgust sensitivities and rules" (pp. 20). For one thing, those with 
whom we spend our private time inevitably come into contact with 
the smells and emissions that we succeed, with effort, in masking or 
containing in public (pp. 138-39). But the relationship between dis­
gust and intimacy turns out to be much more fundamental than this. 
"[T]he boundary of the self is manned at its most crucial and vul­
nerable points by disgust" (p. 137). For that very reason, there can 
be no more potent "means for demonstrating 'and proving love" 
than to forebear - or even invite - the transgression of such a 
boundary (p. 137). By handling their children's' feces and vomit, 
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parents mark themselves out as "those who will care no matter 
what" (pp. 133, 134-35). "[S]omeone else's tongue in your mouth 
can be a sign of intimacy [precisely] because it can also be a disgust­
ing assault" (p. 137). In this improbable manner, disgust enables us 
to experience love's signature merging of self into other. 
Another provocative thesis is the link Miller sees between dis­
gust and misogyny. "[T]he durability of misogyny," he argues, 
"owes much to male disgust for semen," which Miller describes as 
"perhaps the most powerfully contaminating emission" (pp. 19-20). 
Men are sickened by their own sperm not merely "because it shares 
a pathway with urine" or even "because it has other primary disgust 
features (it is slimy, sticky, and viscous)," but primarily "because it 
appears under conditions that are dignity-destroying, a prelude to 
the mini-shames attendant on post-ejaculatory tristesse" (pp. 103-
04). Thus, according to Miller, men loathe women both as the insti­
gators of the indignity of ejaculation and as the receptacles of their 
ejaculate - a claim for which Miller finds evidence in "the enor­
mous expenditures on pharmaceuticals, personal 'hygiene' prod­
ucts, and advertising designed to cleanse the whole terrain" of the 
vagina (p. 104). 
After a brief excursion into history, the book concludes with 
three masterful chapters on the moral and political significance of 
disgust. Drawing on Adam Smith - whose "moral world," Miller 
argues, was "primarily one of shame [and] disgust . . . rather than 
one of guilt and anger" (p. 189) - Miller depicts disgust as an indis­
pensable member of our moral vocabulary. "It signals seriousness, 
commitment, indisputability, presentness, and reality" (p. 180); "it 
marks out moral matters for which we can have no compromise" (p. 
194), "harms that sicken us in the telling, things for which there 
could be no plausible claim of right" (p. 36). No other moral senti­
ment is up to the task of condemning such singular abominations as 
"rape, child abuse, torture, genocide, predatory murder and maim­
ing"; bare indignation, for example, is too self-centered, too ob­
sessed with "setting the balance right" for perceived slights to one's 
own person, to motivate the impassioned desire to punish such 
wrongs even when visited upon strangers (pp. 36, 186, 195). Indeed, 
we cannot "put cruelty first among vices," writes Miller, unless we 
treat properly directed disgust as one of our virtues.27 
Nevertheless, disgust can also mislead because of its sweep. Un­
like moral sentiments such as guilt and anger, disgust is not much 
concerned with whether a person's failings originate in culpable 
choices; it regards those arising from unchosen defects of character 
- indeed, unchosen.defects themselves - as proper objects of re-
27. Here Miller draws on the philosopher Judith Shklar. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, 0RDI· 
NARY VICES (1984). 
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vulsion as well: we are disgusted not just by· cruelty but also by 
stupidity, ugliness, and deformity (p. 198). Moreover, disgust im­
plores us to condemn persons for these failings. We rationalize our 
aversions to them by "imput[ing] intentionality to their disgusting­
ness" (p. 65); we "blame[ ] [them] for not attending to the special 
duties to avoid contact that their pariah status imposes on them" (p. 
65); and we ultimately "judg[e]" them for what they are, "according 
[them] a lower place in the moral and social order because of" their 
unchosen defects (p. 183). In this way, disgust collapses the "dis­
tinction between the moral and the aesthetic" (p. 21) - a distinc­
tion that can itself be "understood to be ... a moral claim about the 
proper content of the moral," intended "to cabin by a fiat of catego­
rization the rather insistent psychological and social tendencies we 
evince to accord moral significance to beauty and ugliness and to 
fail to distinguish consistently the good from the beautiful" (p. 200). 
As a result of the moral claims of disgust, "[w]e end up punishing 
the stigmatized, who may have no justifiable cause for feeling guilty 
for their stigma, although they often internalize the social judg­
ments of their stigmatization as shame, self-loathing, self-disgust, 
self-contempt, self-hatred" (p. 202). 
"Our moral world is thus at odds with itself'' (p. 201). "We fear 
that disgust and contempt may violate norms of fairness and justice, 
of a liberal respect for persons; that they may maintain brutal and 
indefensible regimes" (p. 202). The solution; however, can't be to 
banish disgust and related sentiments, for "despite their considera­
ble warts contempt and disgust do proper moral work" (p. 202). 
"What we need," then, "are ways of knowing when to trust our dis­
gust and contempts" (p. 202). For that purpose, moreover, there is 
no mechanical algorithm to apply; we can do no better than to 
"limit[ ] the scope of [dis gust's] legitimacy by recourse to other 
norms we accept" (p. 202). 
No doubt in part because of its indispensable - if problematic 
- moral function, disgust also plays an inescapable role in ordering 
political and social life. The ordering, of course, is hierarchical; but 
the fascinating point is that disgust and related sentiments, accord­
ing to Miller, do no less hierarchical ordering in contemporary dem­
ocratic regimes than they did in historical aristocratic ones. In 
democracy, disgust becomes aligned with a species of "upward con­
tempt" in which members of lower classes feel empowered to look 
down on members of higher ones, whose "manner and smell reveal 
the[ir] feminization" (pp. 207, 253) - a metaphor that underscores 
the affinity between disgust and misogyny. Of course, the high for 
their part continue to look down on the .low as well. Indeed, "the 
mutuality of contempt," not the obliteration of it, is "what pluralis­
tic democracy is all about" (p. 234). For that reason, groups seeking 
to raise their status in society are more intent on appropriating the 
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idiom of disgust and turning it on their detractors than on van­
quishing those sensibilities altogether (pp. 235-37). 
Still, the durability of disgust does ultimately constrain the 
forms of equality that society can experience, because at least some 
of those forms do demand that we overcome our revulsions toward 
those who aren't like us. This is the theme of the concluding essay 
of the book, "Orwell's Sense of Smell," in which Miller details 
George Orwell's disgust for the grimy lack of hygiene he encoun­
tered in the home of the workers whom the English socialists 
wished to organize (pp. 235-54). No amount of bathing, Miller sug­
gests, would have solved this problem either, for Orwell's disgust 
was constructed as much by his belief in the filthiness of the work­
ers as the reality of their grime: "Whether they really smelled or 
not, a stench would be imputed to them and presumably suggestion 
and wishful thinking made it so" (p. 247). In the end, then, social­
ism founders not on the shoals of individual self-interest or greed 
but on the disgust sensibilities of the elite, in whose nostrils the 
working class will always stink. 
III. APPROPRIATING MILLER'S DISGllSTFOR CRIMINAL LAW 
How persuasive is Miller's account? His analysis can be - and 
has been - criticized on numerous grounds.28 For an avowed so­
cial constructivist, Miller shows surprisingly little interest in cross­
cultural variation in disgust sensibilities. He can't be faulted for 
aiming to produce an account that "resonat[ es] with Americans of 
[his] social class" (p. 11) - who else could really be expected to 
read it? - but he can be faulted for assuming that their under­
standing of disgust wouldn't be deepened by knowing how theirs 
differs from that of others. In addition, Miller's methods are decid­
edly nonempirical, consisting largely in his interpretations of se­
lected works of literature, philosophy, and Freudian psychology, 
leavened with liberal doses of introspection and personal anecdote. 
As a result, many . of Miller's central claims - including the as­
serted loathsomeness of semen - seem idiosyncratic, if not weirdly 
autobiographical. 
Even more critically, Miller simply assumes that disgust is a uni­
tary phenomenon. His account ranges over a breathtakingly wide 
expanse of aversions - from the shuddering horror we have to­
ward snakes to the niggling irritation we have toward strange­
sounding laughter; from the sickening heaviness we experience 
from eating too much rich food to the incensed outrage we experi­
ence toward heinous crimes. We do in fact use the term disgust to 
28. See, e.g., Robert Grudin, Eeew! Grossi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, § 7, at 34; Martha 
C. Nussbaum, Foul Play, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997, at 32. 
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refer to all of these sensibilities, but does it follow that what we find 
appalling about each is really the "same"? If that isn't so - if, in 
fact, "disgust," like "bad" or "unpleasant," is a conventional short­
hand for diverse collections of aversions that can't intelligibly be 
extricated from the particular settings in which we experience them 
- then an account that tries to amalgamate all of our "disgust" 
usages into one master conception amounts to a contrived and fu­
tile exercise. 
My aim, however, is not to determine whether Miller gets it 
right about disgust. Rather, it is to see whether Miller's account 
supplies a useful remedy for the inattention to disgust in criminal 
law theory. And for that purpose, it is neither necessary nor suffi­
cient that his account be true in some abstract philosophical sense. 
Tue law has its own distinctive purposes and needs. If it doesn't 
suit these, even an admittedly true account of disgust would be ir­
relevant or possibly even pernicious. By the same token, the law 
might be justified in accepting the guidance of an admittedly false 
account if it could nonetheless be shown to be useful.29 
I believe Miller's account is extremely useful both for under­
standing and for evaluating the role of a particular type of recurring 
disgust sensibility in criminal law. Broadly speaking, this is the sen­
sibility of revulsion that individuals experience when confronted by 
others - whether sexual deviants or sadistic criminals - whose 
values seem shockingly alien and dangerous. Tue desire to separate 
them from the rest of us - literally or symbolically - motivates 
individuals to lash out against them in violence, and communities to 
punish them in appropriately severe and expressive ways. 
Recognizing this species of motivation fills a sizeable gap in the 
dominant theories of criminal law. Neither consequentialism, which 
focuses on the future societal benefits associated with punishing a 
particular offender, nor voluntarism, which insists that we confine 
punishment to those who freely choose to break the law, take any 
overt stance on the moral quality of offenders' values.30 Their tax­
onomies of relevant emotions are correspondingly limited: they 
purport to tell us how the law will deal with fear or anger to the 
extent that those passions can be understood to correlate with a 
person's propensity for violence or to undermine her volition to a 
particular degree; but they have notQ.!ng to say about disgust under­
stood as an aversion to deviancy. As a result, the dominant theories 
29. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 350; cf. Frederick Schauer, Commensura­
bility and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 786 (1994) (defending a 
mode of analysis that values "philosophical positions strategically on the basis of their ex­
pected consequences"). 
30. See generally Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 301-05. 
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lack the conceptual resources to make sense of a diverse range of 
legal phenomena that are concerned with exactly that sensibility. 
But as important as disgust so conceived is to criminal law, it 
should also be clear that my claims about it are limited. In particu­
lar, unlike Miller, I have no stake in demonstrating that the salient 
features of this species of "disgust" are in fact essential to all the 
diverse sensibilities conventionally· assigned that label. Indeed, 
nothing in particular rides on whether aversion to deviant values is 
properly called "disgust," although that is usually what it's called in 
the contexts I'll address. Nor will I be attempting to show that what 
I'm calling "disgust" for this purpose explains every important fea­
ture of criminal law. Appraisals of anger, fear, and other emotions 
also explain a lot (although, as Martha Nussbaum and I have ar­
gued elsewhere, the way in which the law appraises them differs 
from what either consequentialism or voluntarism contemplates 31). 
The next two parts of this review use Miller's account to explain 
and appraise the role of disgust in criminal law. To set up that dis­
cussion, I want to distill from Miller four distinct theses that I be­
lieve have particular relevance. 
The first I'll call the evaluative thesis. Broadly speaking, the 
Western tradition in philosophy and the social sciences reflects two 
competing conceptions of emotion. The mechanistic conception 
sees emotions as thoughtless surges of affect, or bare physiological 
impulses. The evaluative conception treats emotions as embodying 
a person's cognitive evaluations of particular goods and exper­
iences. It holds, too, that emotions, as judgments of this sort, can 
themselves be evalµated as true or, false, good or bad, reasonable or 
unreasonable, and not just as strong or.weak. 32 
By virtue of the connection he sees. between disgust and social 
norms, Miller falls squarely into the evaluative camp. For him, dis­
gust is not a "purely instinctual drive"; nor can it be flatly equated 
with any physiological. state, such as nausea (pp. 7-8). Rather, 
"[ d]isgust necessarily involves pcµ-ticular thoughts" - themselves 
culturally determined - "about the repugnance of that which is its 
object" (p. 8). Disgust "evaluates (negatively) what it touches, pro­
claim[ing] the meanness and inferiority of its object" and the imper­
ative of being rid of it lest one be contaminated by it and thus 
lowered in status (pp. 8-9). What's more, we can and do evaluate 
persons based on the content of their disgust sensibilities: "depend­
ing on how far they deviate from our norms," we view individuals 
whose sensibilities are less sensitive or simply different from ours 
31. See id. at 301-46. 
32. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 275-301; see also MICHAEL STOKER & 
ELIZABETH HEGEMAN, VALUING EMOTIONS (1996) (defending an evaluative conception). 
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"either as foreign or primitive and thus vaguely exotic, or as bar­
baric and disgusting" in their own right (pp. 11-12). 
Second is the hierarchy thesis. The social function of disgust, 
according to Miller, is to construct and reinforce status rankings. 
Disgust sensibilities police social boundaries, determining who de­
serves esteem and admiration and who loathing and contempt. By 
feeling it and acting on it, individuals prevent subversion of the 
norms that keep the low in their proper place and assure the high 
their own preeminence. Disgust and related sensibilities thus 
"work to hierarchize our political order: in some settings they do 
the work of maintaining hierarchy; in other settings they constitute 
righteously presented claims for superiority; in yet other settings 
they are themselves elicited as an indication of one's proper place­
ment in the social order" (pp. 8-9). 
Third is the conservation thesis. Although the objects of disgust 
vary across societies and communities, all societies inevitably make 
use of disgust to inform their judgments of high and low, worthy 
and unworthy. This is so not only for aristocratic regimes, in which 
distinctions of class are uncontested, but also for egalitarian demo­
cratic ones, which are "based less on mutual respect for persons 
than on a ready availability of certain styles of contempt to the low 
that once were the prerogatives of the high" (p. 21). The conserva­
tion of disgust across distinct and evolving modes of social organiza­
tion explains why groups that are low in status seek to appropriate 
rather than annihilate the idiom of disgust, and why disgust, rather 
than disappearing, instead becomes a salient focal point for political 
contention within socially fluid, pluralistic societies. The question is 
never whether a society should organize itself around emphatic 
ideas of high and low, worthy and worthless, but only what tlie con­
tent of those animating hierarchies will be. 
Fourth is the moral ambivalence thesis. For Miller, our moral 
world is tragically configured: We need disgust to mark the em­
phatic nature of our strongest moral commitments and to motivate 
us to punish atrocious wrongs against strangers. Yet Miller recog­
nizes, too, that disgust has the power to mislead by treating "beauty 
and ugliness [as] a matter of morals" (p. 200), and thus importuning 
us to hold persons accountable for nonculpable defects of character. 
There is, sadly, no reliable moral theory that stands outside our dis­
gust sensibilities and that we can treat as normative for them. All 
we can do is test the urgent claims of disgust by appeal to "other 
moral sentiments, like guilt and benevolence," (p. 197) and to 
"other norms we accept" (p. 202). 
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N. EXPLAINING DISGUST IN CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Disgust Crimes 
[Vol. 96:1621 
What to do about "hate crimes" - assaults motivated by ani­
mus toward victims' group identities - is now an issue of national 
concem.33 Should persons who commit such offenses be punished 
more severely? If they kill, should they be ineligible for Initigation 
under the voluntary manslaughter doctrine? Indeed, should group 
hatred be a grounds for the death penalty? If the answer to any of 
these question is yes, which kinds of group animus - those based 
on race, religion, and ethnicity only, or also those based on gender 
and sexual orientation - should the law concern itself with? These 
are all issues of dispute.34 Drawing on Miller, I want to suggest that 
the "hate crimes" debate is better understood as a "disgust crimes" 
debate: at issue is whom we should regard as low and containinat­
ing - the persons singled out for attacks on the basis of their iden­
tities, or the persons who attack them for that reason. 
Return to Carr and Bemardski, the cases with which I started 
this review. The disagreement between them is in fact representa­
tive of a schism in the law over whether killers should be perinitted 
to assert ho.mophobia - frequently styled "homosexual panic" syn­
drome by expert witnesses35 - as Initigation under the voluntary 
manslaughter doctrine.36 The source of the disagreement seems 
puzzling under the standard view of how that doctrine works: if 
voluntary manslaughter Initigates when strong impulses underinine 
the offender's volition,37 then why wouldn't jurisdictions converge 
on an approach to such killings based on prevailing scientific views 
33. See, e.g., James Bennet, Clinton Backs Expanding Definition of a Hate Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A20. 
. 
34. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. S12577 (Nov. 13, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (advo­
cating the addition of assaults motivated by animus against gays, women, and the handi­
capped to federal "hate crimes" legislation); The 'Hate-Crime' Problem, Editorial, WASH. 
PoST, Nov. 17, 1997, at A22 ("[T]he victim of a bias- motivated stabbing is no more dead 
than someone stabbed during a mugging. Ultimately, we prosecute crimes, not feelings. 
Guiding how people feel about one another is only marginally a law enforcement concern."); 
Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12 (criticizing federal legisla­
tion aimed at treating certain forms of violence as "hate crimes" against women). 
35. See, e.g., Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Posner, J., 
concurring); People v. Cord, 607 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Dietrich, 567 
So. 2d 623, 632 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Thomas, 616 A.2d 365, 370 (Md. 1992). 
36. Compare, e.g., Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Ho­
mosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133 (1992) (collecting author­
ities and arguing against permitting use of the manslaughter theory in such circumstances) 
with Dressler, supra note 18 (defending the availability of manslaughter). 
37. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Ra­
tionale, 73 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467 (1982) (rationalizing the doctrine on these 
grounds). But see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 306-10 (challenging this view). 
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on whether "homosexual panic" impairs self-control?38 Indeed, the 
disagreement in the cases doesn't seem to have much at all to do 
with the effect of this condition on offenders' volition. The court in 
Carr, for example, refused even to consider psychiatric evidence re­
lating to the intensity of the defendant's homophobia,39 whereas the 
court in Bernardski cheerfully mitigated the defendant's sentence 
notwithstanding the premeditated nature of his attack.40 
But Miller's account of disgust suggests a set of hypotheses that 
clarify matters. Clearly offenders who kill (or assault) on the basis 
of "homosexual panic" are disgusted by their victims. Under the 
evaluative thesis, what would be distinctive about their aversion 
wouldn't be its physiological intensity - a mechanistic notion -
but rather its embodiment of the offenders' appraisal of gays and 
lesbians as inferior and contaminating. Under the hierarchy thesis, 
the offenders' animus would be constructed by and reinforce status 
norms, which the offenders understand to be threatened by homo­
sexuality. By the same token, we would have to understand courts 
to be evaluating the offenders' disgust sensibilities and constructing 
norms of hierarchy by deciding how severely to punish them. Deci­
sions that withhold mitigation would be doing this every bit as 
much as ones that grant it. Indeed, consistent with the conservation 
thesis, we should expect to see the forces who are committed to 
raising the status of gays and lesbians engaged in their own effort to 
seize hold of the law's machinery for expressing disgust and redi­
recting it against homophobes. 
All of these hypotheses tum qut to be true. Start with the na­
ture of homophobia. Empirical social psychology confirms that 
homophobia, like Miller's disgust, is an evaluative sensibility in­
fused with hierarchical status norms. Homophobia depends on a 
set of beliefs, derived from membership in a social group, that as­
sign status according to conventional gender roles.41 Members of 
such groups may view homosexuality as a potentially contaminating 
influence in part because of anxiety about their own sexual orienta-
38. In fact, there is essentially no credible psychiatric evidence that it does. See Gary 
David Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 81, 83-89 
(1992). 
39. See Co=onwealth v. Carr, 580 A.id 1362, 1365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
40. See Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence, supra note 10; Judge Is Censured, supra note 
10. 
41. See Gregory M. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social Psychological Perspective 
on Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, in BASHERS, BAITERS & BIGOTS: HOMOPHOBIA 
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1, 12-13 (John P. De Cecco ed., 1985) [hereinafter Herek, Beyond 
"Homophobia"]; Gregory M. Herek, Psychological Heterosexism and Anti-Gay Violence: the 
Social Psychology of Bigotry and Bashing, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE 
AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 149, 153-54 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 
1992) [hereinafter Herek, Psychological Heterosexism]. 
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tion.42 But even more fundamentally, homosexuality threatens 
them insofar as they perceive it as subverting the norms that under­
write their own status and sense of self-worth: the more widespread 
toleration of homosexuality becomes, the less esteem and credit are 
due for conforming to conventional, heterosexual gender roles.43 
Against the background of such norms, feeling and expressing 
homophobia are mechanisms for assuring oneself of one's own 
value, 44 for acquiring status within the group, 45 and for securing the 
status of that group in society by clearly marking out homosexuals 
as lower in rank. 46 
The judicial decisions, too, conform to Miller's account. Thus, 
the court in Bemardski mitigated the defendant's punishment not 
on the mechanistic ground that he had been deprived of the capac­
ity for self-control, but on the evaluative one that the defendant was 
right to be disgusted by his victims' homosexuality. The judge him­
self was disgusted by it: for him, the lives of homosexuals, whom he 
"put ... at about the same level" as prostitutes, were obviously 
worth less than those of good heterosexual persons.47 Indeed, 
"cruising" homosexuals threaten good persons, like the judge's own 
teenage son, who might be "picked up" and thus lowered to the 
homosexuals' level.48 By mitigating Bemardski's sentence on these 
42. See, e.g.1 Herek, Psychological Heterosexism, supra note 41, at 155 (asserting that 
those anxious about their own orientation "often express[ 1 . . . strong feelings of disgust 
toward homosexuality or ... perce[ive] ... danger from gay people of [their] own gender"). 
43. See Herek, Beyond "Homophobia," supra note 41, at 12 {"As with symbolic racism, 
symbolic sexual attitudes express the feeling that cherished values are being violated and that 
illegitimate demands are being made for changes in the status quo."); see also Lawrence 
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 987-89 (1995) (using this 
aspect of homophobia to explain opposition to lifting of ban on gays in military). 
44. ·See Herek, Psychological Heterosexfsm, supra note 41, at 153 {"Such attitudes help 
people to increase their self-esteem by expressing important aspects of themselves - by 
declaring (to themselves and to others) what sort of people they are. Affirming who one is 
often is accomplished by distancing oneself from or even attacking people who represent the 
sort of person one is not (or does not want to be)."). · 
45. See id. at 154 (asserting that homophobia "strengthens one's sense of belonging to a 
particular group and helps an individual to gain acceptance, approval, or love from other 
people whom she or he considers important" and that "denigrating [gays and lesbians] solidi­
fies one's own status as an insider, one who belongs .to the group"). 
46. See Karl M. Hamner, Gay-Bashing: A Social Identity Analysis of Violence Against 
Lesbians and Gay Men, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND 
GAY MEN, supra note 41, at 179, 182-83 (arguing that homophobes "use denigration and 
discrimination, including violence, to create a negative evaluation of gay men and lesbians 
and thereby" raise their own status and that "[a]s a group generally held in low regard by 
society, lesbians and gay men are likely to represent a relevant out-group for all quarters of 
society, particularly for individuals lower in the social system"); see also Richard A. Berk et 
al., Thinking More Clearly About Hate-Motivated Crime, in HATE CRIMES: CoNFRoNTINO 
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 41, at 123, 127 (characterizing 
homophobic assaults as "symbolic crimes" among competing groups). 
47. See Belkin, supra note 10. 
48. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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grounds, the judge was clearly motivated by, and clearly sought to 
reinforce, hierarchical social norms. 
Indeed, Miller's conception of disgust helps to explain a peculiar 
doctrinal disconnect in the homosexual panic cases. The usual oc­
casion for mitigation under the voluntary manslaughter doctrine is 
an uninvited affront that provokes a flash of immediate anger or 
fear.49 But as Bernardski illustrates, homophobic killers frequently 
plan their killings, oftentimes hunting down victims who pose no 
physical threat.50 This species of violence, and the inclination of 
decisionmakers to excuse it, are best understand within the logic of 
disgust. Whereas anger and fear react to transgressions against 
one's own person, disgust takes aim at a more diffuse object -
namely, the threat that open deviance poses to the status of those 
who faithfully abide by dominant norms. Merely rebuffing the odd 
homosexual advance isn't enough to protect the homophobe from 
that sort of threat; rather he must undertake the "much more inten­
sive and problematic labor" of "cleansing and purifying" (p. 26) the 
normative environs.51 Mitigating the punishment of those who 
shoulder this burden enables legal decisionmakers to show that 
they, too, are committed to the norms that underwrite status in 
homophobic communities. 
Decisions rejecting mitigation do just as much evaluating and 
constructing, albeit in the opposite direction. They tell us, as the 
court did in Carr, that the homophobic killer's disgust - no matter 
how intense-is not "reasonable."52 And in so doing, they repudi­
ate norms that value persons according to conventional gender 
roles: "the law does not condone or excuse the killing of homosex­
uals any more than it condones the killing of heterosexuals."53 
But do these decisions -as the conservation thesis predicts -
also assign homophobes to a lower status because their aberrant dis­
gust sensibilities render them"'barbaric and disgusting" (pp.11-12)? 
That's at least a reasonable interpretation of thein: , unable to assert 
a manslaughter theory, Carr ended up convicted of first degree 
murder; what better result to convey that homophobia, like "rape, 
child abuse, torture, genocide, predatory murder and maiming" is 
one of the "things for which there could be no plausible claim of 
right" (p. 36), that our opposition to it is one of the "moral matters 
49. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10 (2d ed. 
1986). 
50. See Comstock, supra note 38, at 96-97. 
51. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 372-75 (1997) (showing how "esteem norms" can motivate 
individuals to engage in conspicuous disciplining of deviants). 
52. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
53. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1364. 
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for which we can have no compromise"?54 But it's also possible to 
read these decisions as being indifferent to disgust or even hostile to 
it insofar as that sentiment ranks persons on the basis of their 
values. 
Laws that enhance the penalty for bias-motivated crimes, how­
ever, unambiguously seek to appropriate and redirect disgust. Sup­
porters of such laws want the public to understand not just that the 
"hate" killers are wrong to be disgusted by their victims, but that 
they themselves are "twisted," "warped," "sick," and "disgusting," 
and as a result properly despised as outsiders.55 Severe punishment 
is the idiom that the criminal law uses to get that message across. 
Indeed, advocates for gays, women, African Americans, Jews, and 
others perceive severe punishments as conferring the high status 
that violence against them seeks to deny - which is exactly why 
political contention surrounding hate crimes is so intense.56 
Consider here another disgust-crime story. To show a friend 
how easy it would be to get away with killing, Gunner Lindberg, a 
self-proclaimed white supremacist, picked out Vietnamese-Ameri­
can Thien Minh Ly from a crowd of roller skaters at a high school 
playground and stabbed him some fifty times in the body and 
54. P. 196. Because the standards that most jurisdictions use to delimit first degree mur­
der are essentially contentless, the only basis juries have for assigning killings to that class is 
that such killings strike them as exceedingly reprehensible. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra 
note 19, at 324-25. The killers whose motivations seem repulsive are likely to dominate this 
class. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 437 
(1990). 
55. See, e.g., James Brooke, Crowd in Denver Rallies Against Skinhead Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A20 ("'They [white supremacist 'skinheads'] are not part of Den­
ver's culture. They are not part of Denver's vision. They are not wanted here."' (quoting 
Denver Mayor Wellington E. Webb)); Roger Buckwalter, Hate Remains a Poison in Society, 
JUPITER CouRIER (Jupiter, Fla.), Sept. 11, 1996, at A4 (describing swastika graffiti: "This 
disgusting act by a mental and moral midget . . .  was just more evidence - as if any more was 
needed - that hate continues to infest this free society . . . .  "); Hundreds Mourn Victim of 
Skinhead, 19, in Denver, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at A16 (quoting mayor at funeral of hate 
crime victim: "It's intolerable that something like that happens. It's disgusting to me person­
ally that it happened in our city"); Neo-Nazis Still Here, Editorial, SEAITLE TIMES, Mar. 25, 
1997, at B4 (denouncing "[t]he disgusting celebration marking Hitler's birthday that's usually 
held by [local] neo-Nazis"); John Nichols, 'Time to Stand Up, Be Counted, ' Protest Klan, 
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Aug. 22, 1995, at SA (reporting a local woman's decision to 
display a pink triangle "to signal disgust with the Klan's homophobia"); President Starts Anti­
Hate Campaign, Cm. TRIB., June 8, 1997, § 1, at 7 ("Voicing disgust over violent bigotry, 
President Clinton on Saturday ordered a Justice Department review of laws against hate 
crimes and said he will convene a White House conference on the problem next fall."); Ryan 
R. Sanderson, Letter to the Editor, Cunanan crime isn't homosexuality, BALTIMORE SUN, 
July 24, 1997, at 14A (reacting to a comment that a gay man deserved to be shot by asserting 
that "[t]his is the sickest belief I can imagine"). 
56. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 2-4 (1995); Jean Hampton, The 
Retributive idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 
140-42 (1988); see also Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, 
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1393-94, 1425 (1988) (describing willingness 
to execute murderers of African Americans as measure of African American status). 
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neck.57 Writing later to a cousin, Lindberg boasted of "kill[ing] a 
Jap a while ago." 
I walked right up to him and he was scared. I looked at him and said, 
"Oh, I thought I knew you," and he got happy that he wasn't gonna 
get jumped, then I hit him. I stabbed him in the side about seven or 
eight times. He rolled over a little, so I stabbed his back 18 or 19 
times. Then he lay flat and I slit . . . his throat on his jugular vein.58 
For this crime, Lindberg (who wore a Dallas Cowboys football 
jersey every day at trial to mark that team's Super Bowl victory on 
the day of the attack59) earned the distinction of becoming the first 
offender sentenced to death under a California law authorizing cap­
ital punishment for racially motivated killings.6° Civil rights advo­
cates - including some who ordinarily oppose the death penalty -
hailed the sentence on the ground that it appropriately remarked 
society's disgust for Lindberg and his deed. "It was an incredibly 
disgusting tale of torture and mutilation," the chairman of the Or­
ange County Human Relations Commission noted in support of the 
sentence. "There's no question this is a sick act of a really troubled 
mind."61 
B. Disgust and Punishment 
In the last section, I used the evaluative thesis, the hierarchy 
thesis, and the conservation thesis to explain the nature of the "hate 
cclmes" debate. In this one, I use the moral ambivalence thesis -
or at least the part of it that asserts that disgust is an indispensable 
component of our moral vocabulary - to explain another criminal 
law phenomenon: namely, the distinctive forms that punishment 
assumes in American criminal law. 
To punish serious crimes, the American public has a decided 
preference for imprisonment. There's really no alternative to incar­
ceration - aside, perhaps, from the death penalty, which I'll put 
aside for now - for murderers, armed robbers, and rapists. But 
violent offenders such as these make up far less than half the Amer­
ican prison population.62 The rest are there for nonviolent offenses 
- from theft, to drunk driving, to drug possession, to various and 
57. See Thao Hua, Murderer Had Troubled Youth, Psychologist Says, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
1997, at Bl. 
58. Greg Hernandez, Supremacist Sentenced to Death For Hate Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
13, 1997, at Al. 
59. See Greg Hernandez, O.C. Jury Votes Death for Hate Crime Murder, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 1997, at Al. 
60. See CAL. PENAL Coos § 190.2(a)(16) (West 1988); Hernandez, supra note 58. 
61. Hernandez, supra note 59. 
62. Only 47% of the 989,000 persons incarcerated in state prisons and jails (as of 1995) 
were serving time for violent offenses. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Popula­
tions in the United States, 1995, at 9, tbl. 1.11 (June 1997) (NCJ-163916). The percentage was 
even smaller for persons incarcerated in federal prisons (as of 1996), where nearly 60% of the 
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sundry white collar crimes - and serve two years of jail time or less 
on average. 6 3  Criminologists of diverse ideologies have long op­
posed imprisoning offenders such as these on the grounds that it's 
unnecessary to incapacitate them and that their brand of criminality 
could be deterred just as well by alternative sanctions such as fines 
and community service. 64 But this shopworn case for alternative 
sanctions has made essentially no impression on legislators, judges, 
and sentencing commissioners. 6 5  
The political resistance to alternative sanctions seems puzzling 
under the conventional theories of punishment. From an optimal 
deterrence point of view, the alternatives seem superior because 
they are just as effective and less costly to society. 6 6  Retribution 
insists that offenders be made to experience pain in strict propor­
tion to the moral wrongness of their respective crimes, regardless of 
the effects of punishment. 67 But liberty deprivation isn't the only 
way to make offenders suffer ; taking their property and appropriat­
ing their labor can do that, too. If we can translate short prison 
terms into equally painful fines or community service dispositions, 
retribution shouldn't as a conceptual matter foreclose alternative 
sanctions. 6 8  Indeed, if, as some argue, relatively well-to-do nonvio­
lent offenders typically suffer more when imprisoned than down­
and-out violent ones, then insisting that the former be imprisoned 
rather than fined or ordered to perform community service might 
inflict more pain on them for less serious crimes, in violation of the 
retributive norm of proportionality. 69 
Elsewhere I've tried to solve the alternative sanctions puzzle 
with the expressive theory of punishment.7 0 Punishment can't be 
reduced to the imposition of suffering. As Henry Hart long ago 
observed, a person can suffer just as much discomfort in the mili­
tary as he can in prison, and yet only imprisonment - and not con-
inmates were serving time for drug offenses. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE S1:ATISTICS 1996, at 533, tbl. 636 (1997). 
63. See id. at 476, tbl. 5.58 (reporting that the average expected sentence for nonviolent 
property offense was 24 months and f9r drug possession, 16 months). 
64. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990); Richard A. Pos­
ner, Optimal Sentences for White- Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 409-10 (1980). 
65. See Kahan, supra note 6, at 592, 605-06. 
66. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. 
EcoN. 169, 193-98 (1968); Posner, supra note 38, at 409-11. 
67. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, 
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW EssAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179-80 (Ferdi­
nand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
68. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 619. 
69. See John R. Lott, Jr., Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?, 95 J. PoL. EcoN. 
1307, 1315 (1987). 
70. See Kahan, supra note 21; Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Jncommensurability, 2 BuFF. 
CRIM. L. REv. 691 (1998). 
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scription ..:___ counts as "punishment," because only imprisonment 
expresses moral condemnation.71 We expect punishment to voice 
our moral outrage, in addition to protecting us from harm and im­
posing deserved suffering. And that's the problem with fines and 
community service: they don't express condemnation, or at least 
don't express it as unequivocally as imprisonment.72 
But why is this the case? What determines whether a particular 
mode of affliction expresses condemnation or not? Obviously, 
there are many influences, most of which are likely to be a matter 
of historical happenstance.73 But drawing on Miller, I want to ar­
gue in addition that the adequacy of a punishment along the expres­
sive dimension will have a lot to do with whether it resonates with 
the public's disgust sensibilities. 
On expressive grounds, serious crimes strike us as such - that 
is, as crimes and as serious - not just because they impair another's 
interests, but because they convey that the wrongdoer doesn't re­
spect the true value of things.74 To express condemnation, then, 
society must respond with a form of punishment that unequivocally 
evinces the community's repudiation of the wrongdoer's valuations. 
According to Miller, that's what we use "the idiom of disgust" for: 
"[i]t signals seriousness, commitment, indisputability, presentness, 
and reality" (p. 180); "it marks out moral matters for which we can 
have no compromise" (p. 194), harms "for which there could be no 
plausible claim of right" (p. 36). It follows that an expressively ef­
fective punishment must make clear that we are in fact disgusted 
with what the offender has done. 
The conventional altematiye sanctions don't do that. Fines, for 
example, seem to say that society is willing to put a price tag on a 
particular species of crime. That connotation is clearly incompati­
ble with disgust: no morally upright person would consent to a dis­
gusting act in exchange for cash! Community service, too, fails to 
evince disgust. Because we see nothing disgusting in repairing di­
lapidated low-income housing, educating the retarded, installing 
smoke detectors in old age homes, and the like, it's hard to see the 
seriousness and indisputability of society's commitment to con-
71. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 
404-05 {1958). 
72. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 617-30. 
73. See, e.g., id. at 610-17 (examining historical origins of social meaning of imprisonment 
and corporal punishment). 
74. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, in MURPHY & HAMPToN, 
supra note 56, at 35, 43-45; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY & 
HAMPToN, supra note 56, at 14, 25. 
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demning the behavior of offenders whom it sentences to engage in 
such services. Sensibilities like these are in fact commonplace.7 5 
Prison, in contrast, does unequivocally evince disgust in Miller's 
terms. By stripping individuals of liberty - a venerated symbol of 
individual worth in our culture - and by inflicting countless other 
indignities - from exposure to the view of others when urinating 
and defecating to rape at the hand of other inmates - prison 
unambiguously marks the lowness of those we consign to it. At the 
same time, imprisonment removes offenders from our midst, shield­
ing us from their contaminating influence. Martha Grace Duncan 
emphasizes these themes in her recent work, Romantic Outlaws, 
Beloved Prisons, 1 6  which probes the social meanings of criminality 
and punishment. For her, it is popular disgust for criminals that 
explains the durability of the prison, which the public sees as "a 
suitably dark, filthy, and remote place" to dispose of the "filth" of 
criminality. 7 7  
There's no reason to suppose, though, that imprisonment is the 
only form of punishment that evinces disgust. Duncan, for exam­
ple, uses disgust sensibilities to explain Britain's establishment of a 
penal colony in Australia. Historians uniformly regard this policy 
as having been a grotesquely inefficient alternative to the simple 
expansion of prison space in Britain itself. But delving into the con­
temporaneous debates that surrounded this issue, Duncan shows 
how transporting criminals recommended itself to eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Englishmen because of its power to symbolize 
the nation's virtuous attempts to cleanse itself of "refuge" and 
"scum" - to expel, in Bentham's words, "the excrementitious 
mass" of criminality from the body politic.1s 
For a contemporary disgust-evincing alternative to imprison­
ment, consider the revival of shaming penalties, which are now be­
ing used for a wide variety of common and white collar offenses 
that would otherwise be punished with imprisonment.79 Such pen­
alties typically involve an element of self-debasement: thus, bur­
glars in Tennessee have been ordered to permit their victims to 
enter their homes and take items of the victims' choosing; 80 a New 
75. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 621-24, 626-30 (distilling the social meaning of fines and 
communitr service from various sources). 
76. MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCON· 
SCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1996). 
77. Id. at 146. 
78. See id. at 152. 
79. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 631-34; Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White 
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (unpub­
lished, Dec. 15, 1997). 
80. See Mark Curriden, Making punishment fit crime often not popular, ATLANTA 
CoNST., Jan. 9, 1992, at A3. 
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York City slumlord was sentenced to house arrest in one of his rat­
infested buildings, where tenants greeted him with a banner that 
read, "Welcome, you reptile!";81 a woman in Florida was required 
to buy a newspaper ad announcing, "I purchased marijuana with 
my two kids in the car."82 Because they "inflict[ ] disgrace and con­
tumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner,"83 these punish­
ments, like imprisonment, unambiguously mark out offenders as 
proper objects of revulsion and separate them, symbolically if not 
literally, from virtuous law-abiders.84 Consequently, substituting 
shame for imprisonment does not offend the expressive sensibilities 
that the conventional alternatives rankle. 
The power of shame to express disgust obviously doesn't imply, 
by itself, that shame is a morally appropriate punishment. Indeed, 
as the moral ambivalence thesis predicts, the disgust they express 
and excite is exactly what makes these penalties seem inappropriate 
to some.85 Nevertheless, the link between political acceptability of 
alternative sanctions and their power to express disgust suggests 
that it behooves criminologists and reformers, every bit as much as 
it behooves social and political theorists, to learn the lessons of 
Miller's work. 
C. Disgusting Enough to Die 
If disgust supplies the idiom that we use to "voice . . . our 
strongest sentiments of moral disapprobation" (p. 20), then we 
81. See Don Terry, Landlord in His Own Jail: Tenants Debate His Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 1988, at Bl, col. 5; see also Cm. TRIB., July 3, 1988, at Cl (reporting the same sentence for 
a California slumlord); John Larrabee, Fighting Crime with a Dose of Shame, USA TODAY, 
June 19, 1995, at 3A (reporting that Framingham, Massachusetts, places banners with the 
name of a slumlord on a building after condemning a unit). 
82. Susannah A. Nesmith, Advertise your guilt, judge orders woman after dmg case plea, 
PALM BEACH PoST, Nov. 23, 1996, at lA. 
83. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 S.2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (internal citation 
omitted). See also Carol-Faye Ashcraft, DUI Offenders on Display, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
July 8, 1990, at 6 (criticizing fines because they "may not mean much" while praising shaming 
penalties on the ground that "public humiliation" is "more sobering"); Maureen Fan, Red­
Faced Offender: ls It a Real Shame?, NEWSDAY, June 21, 1995, at A27 ("'One of the reasons 
why people find these kinds of things appealing is not only because they think it'll make them 
safer . . .  but it's also a way of expressing outrage."' (quoting Bob Gang, head of the Correc­
tional Association of New York)); Punishment (editorial), CIN. ENO., June 2, 1994, at AlO 
("'It's my way to impress upon him the humiliation of the act."' (quoting a judge who or­
dered a man convicted of assault to permit his wife to spit in his face)); Scarlet Bumper, TIME, 
June 17, 1985, at 52 ("'[H]umiliation as punishment is valid . . .  .'"). 
84. Indeed, this separation can be more than symbolic to the extent that shaming penal­
ties effectively facilitate shunning of the offender. See Eruc A. POSNER, LAW, COOPERATION, 
AND RATIONAL CH01CE, Ch. 7 (Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming 1999). 
85. See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 
PsYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 645 (1997); James Q. Whitman, What's Wrong with Inflicting 
Shaming Sanctions, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). For a normative defense of shaming penal­
ties, see Kahan, supra note 21, at 637-50; Dan M. Kahan, It's a Shame We Have None, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at Al6. 
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should expect to see disgust playing a critical role in administration 
of the criminal punishment that voices disapprobation in the most 
emphatic terms - namely, the death penalty. And we do. The 
overwhelming majority of states that have the death penalty au­
thorize the sentencer to impose it when the murder is "outrageously 
vile wanton or inhuman," "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," 
or the like.86 This sentencing factor - which I'll refer to as the 
"outrageously vile" standard - singles out killings that are so nau­
seatingly cruel, and killers whose own tastes are so sickeningly de­
praved, that the only just disposition is literally to dispose of the 
offender. 
The cases applying the "outrageously vile" standard involve 
tales that "sicken us in the telling."87 They are the stories of men 
who gang rape an eleven-year old girl in the woods, poke sharp 
sticks through her vagina into her abdominal cavity, and then smash 
her skull with a brick, while she begs for her life;88 who cut out the 
vocal cords of a witness to a crime and then amputate his feet and 
hands with an electric saw;89 who leave the scene of a terrifying 
nighttime burglary with the eighty-year-old victim dying in prayer, a 
knife protruding from her eye socket.90 (As Miller himself observes 
- in a much more prosaic context - it is impossible to write of 
disgusting things without becoming disgusting oneself (p. 5).) 
These cases graphically bear out Miller's contention that we cannot 
"put cruelty first among vices" without counting properly directed 
disgust as a virtue (p. 202): it is not enough to become angry when 
one hears of these atrocities; one must want to retch. 
The "outrageously vile" standard, moreover, recognizes that we 
can be sickened not only by what brutal murderers do, but also by 
what they value and hence who they are. Thus, the sentencer is 
entitled to find the standard satisfied by facts that "evidenc[ e] de­
basement or perversion," or that show that the defendant "rel­
ish[ed] the murdei:."91 Consider here the man who enjoyed 
shooting a woman so much that (with no additional stimulation) he 
experienced an orgasm, and who thereafter entertained himself by 
listening to music on her stereo system and drinking wine from her 
86. Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital 
Cases - the Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941, 943 (1986). 
87. P. 36. Such cases are gruesomely catalogued in Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, 
Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statlltory Aggravating 
Circumstance that Murder Was Heinous, Cruel, Depraved or the Like - Post-Gregg Cases, 63 
A.LR.4th 478 (1988). 
88. See State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616, 621-22, 631 (La. 1984). 
89. See Cavanaugh v. State, 729 P.2d 481 (Nev. 1986). 
90. See Battle v. Armontrout, 814 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (E.D. Mo. 1993), affd. sub nom 
Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547 (8th Cir. 1994). 
91. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990) (plurality opinion) (internal quotes and 
citation omitted). 
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kitchen before finally hanging her from a door knob in a parting 
gesture of contempt.92 Or the men who forced their victim to lick 
beer from the floor and to eat her used sanitary napkin before kill­
ing her.93 Or the one who cut his victim's chest open to observe her 
heart.94 The sentencer's revulsion in such cases, moreover, needn't 
be linked to the suffering that such depraved behavior inflicts on 
the victims; even cases in which � killer mutilates the victim's body, 
or has sex with it, after the victim's death can satisfy the "outra­
geously vile'
, 
standard.95 Just as the evaluative thesis suggests, it is 
the killer's very appetite to do what disgusts us that marks him as 
"barbaric and disgusting" (pp. 11- 12), enough so in fact to justify 
his execution. 
Commentators tend to view the "outrageously vile" factor with 
a constitutionally jaundiced eye. The first principle of the Supreme 
Court's death penalty jurisprudence - represented in Furman v. 
Georgia96 - commands that the sentencer's discretion be con­
strained by precisely worded statutory aggravating factors. The 
"outrageously vile" factor came to grief over the Furman principle 
early on, on the ground that it was too vague to separate the worst 
killings from all the rest: "A person of ordinary sensibility could 
fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wan­
tonly vile, horrible and inhuman[,]
,,, 
the Court claimed.97 Thereaf­
ter, state courts attempted to revive the factor by fashioning 
"limiting constructions."98 But as critics noted, these constructions 
- defining "heinous," for example, as "hatefully or shockingly evil: 
grossly bad"; "cruel'
, 
as "disposed to inflict pain esp[ ecially] in a 
wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic"; and "depraved" 
as "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deteriora­
tion" - seemed no more determinate or constraining than the stat­
utory terms they are explicating.99 The Court has nevertheless 
upheld such constructions of the "outrageously vile" factor �s con­
stitutionally suffident: "an aggravating factor of this nature," the 
Court now recognizes, "is not susceptible of mathematical 
precision. "100 
92. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 282 (Va. 1983). 
93. See Thompson v. State, 389 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 1980). 
94. See Smith v. State, 407 So. 2d 894, 896 (Fla. 1981). 
95. See, e.g., Hance v. State, 268 S.E.2d 339, 346 (Ga. 1980). 
96. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
97. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980); accord Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 
U.S. 356, 363-64 (1988). 
98. See Rosen, supra note 86, at 968-70. 
99. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 693-97 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Rosen, 
supra note 86, at 968-70. 
100. Walton, 497 U.S. at 655 (plurality opinion); accord Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 777 
(1990); see also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (upholding "utter disregard" standard 
construed as meaning "pitiless"). 
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The tortured constitutional history of the "outrageously vile" 
factor itself testifies to the indispensable contribution that disgust 
makes to the capacity for moral discernment. As Miller would pre­
dict, courts recognize the role of disgust sensibilities in revealing to 
us the most singular acts of wickedness and depravity, the ones we 
are obliged to strike back against in the most emphatic form of ac­
tion that our conventions and laws make available to us. And the 
power that disgust gives us to discern and remark such atrocities is 
indeed insusceptible of being captured by - reduced to - a pre­
cise verbal formula. If being guided by such a sensibility is incom­
patible with the demand for formally determinate rules in capital 
sentencing, then, unsurprisingly, it is that demand, and not the sen­
sibility, that gives way.101 
D. Disgust vs. Mercy 
But we should also expect the durability of disgust in capital 
sentencing to be a cause of unease. The moral ambivalence thesis 
sees disgust as furnishing not only indispensable but also imperfect 
moral guidance. In the grip of disgust, Miller argues, we too readily 
blame persons for deformities of character over which they have no 
control. In the nonlegal domain, we construct conventions - in­
cluding the distinction between aesthetics and morals - to check 
this feature of disgust. In law, constraining disgust is the role that 
we assign to mercy in capital sentencing. 
The place of mercy is secured by the rule - established in the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Lockett v. Ohio1°2 and Eddings v. 
Oklahoma103 - that the state may do nothing to prevent the sen­
tencer "from considering . .. any aspect of a defendant's character 
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de­
fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. "1°4 By 
obliging the sentencer to listen to the defendant's story in the terms 
in which he chooses to tell it, the Lockett-Eddings rule recognizes 
that in even the most aggravated cases we may be moved by "'com­
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties 
of humankind.'"105 
101. Indeed, one might argue that the ultimate vagueness of the "outrageously vile" stan­
dard is, in this sense, a virtue, because any determinate rule would necessarily disable the 
sentencer from recognizing the diverse forms that cruelty and depravity can assume. For a 
perceptive (and doctrinally heretical) argument to this effect, see Paul J .  Heald, Medea and 
the Un-Man: Literary Guidance in the Determination of Heinousness Under Maynard v. Cart­
wright, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 571 (1995). 
102. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
103. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
104. 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett). 
105. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 n.7 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
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The tension between the Furman rule and the Lockett-Eddings 
rule is patent.106 The former tells the state that it must adopt statu­
tory factors that constrain the capital sentencer's discretion, the lat­
ter that it must not. More than one Justice has concluded that these 
directives are conceptually and practically irreconcilable.101 
But why assume the values at stake in capital sentencing admit 
of rational harmonization? According to Miller, our moral world is 
tragically configured: both disgust and individual autonomy make 
legitimate claims upon us; any approach to moral decisionmaking 
that even purported to dispel the tension between them would nec­
essarily blind us to the insights of one or the other or both. The 
only proper response to this conflict is to avoid giving "any one 
moral sentiment the power to govern all situations in which it may 
be elicited" (p. 202) - to structure our moral conventions to assure 
that both the norms embodied in disgust and the norms embodied 
in "other moral sentiments, like guilt and benevolence" (p. 197) are 
given free range to appraise the situation. 
Furman and Lockett-Eddings structure the capital sentencing 
process to reproduce this tension-embracing solution. Furman 
gives free range to our moral-condemning norms. It is at that point 
that the law allows disgust to appraise the offenders' crime through 
aggravating factors such as the "outrageously vile" standard or Cal­
ifornia's racial-hatred factor. But under Lockett-Eddings, the law 
tests the claims of our disgust by creating the space for mercy. That 
sentiment embodies our condemnation-abatement norms, including 
recognition of the role that "the diverse frailties of humankind" 
may have played in making the offender an object of revulsion. 
Whatever tension there is between Furman and Lockett-Eddings is 
thus a genuine tension in our moral values; the response of that 
doctrinal regime is to conserve the insights of all our moral senti­
ments rather than privileging only a subset of them. 
Consistent with the moral ambivalence thesis, the law remains 
faithful to both the certainty of our disgust sensibilities and the sec­
ond-order doubts we have about whether that certainty is war­
ranted. When we contemplate the cruelty of his deeds, and the 
depravity of his motivations, we may have no doubt that a Gunner 
Lindberg or a Stephen Roy Carr is a proper recipient of the law's 
most severe punishment. But we know that even a Lindberg or a 
106. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and 
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991). 
107. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1128-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 909-911, (1993) (Thomas, J., concur­
ring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 661-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con­
curring in the judgment). For attempts to dispel the tension, see Stephen P. Garvey, "As The 
Gentle Rain From Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 989, 115-122 
(1996); Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & Pull. A.FF. 83 (1993). 
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Carr is likely to have a story to tell - of the warping influences of 
childhood neglect; of psychoses, intermingled with drug abuse; of 
traumatic events, such as prison rape or perceived racial discrimina­
tionios - a story that seeks to persuade us not that we are wrong to 
be disgusted by him, but that he has become disgusting for reasons 
that he couldn't control. 109 Such stories may not move us; indeed, 
the California jury that sentenced Lindberg to death obviously was 
not moved. But the law's unwillingness to put such offenders to 
death before it even hears how they became what they are evi­
dences the war that mercy wages against the imperial ambitions of 
our disgust. 
V. Ev ALUATING DISGUST IN CRIMINAL LAW 
My aim so far has been to show that disgust does in fact play a 
central role in criminal law. But nothing I've said implies, necessar­
ily, that this role is morally justified. Indeed, seeing how much con­
sequence the law invests in our disgust sensibilities should make us 
more intent, not less, on determining whether the law's confidence 
in that sentiment is warranted. 
I now want to take a step in the direction of vindicating that 
confidence. I don't intend to advance a complete defense of disgust 
in criminal law, but drawing on Miller, I will address what I take to 
be the most powerful claim that can be made on disgust's behalf -
namely, that it is essential to perceiving and condemning cruelty. If 
this is so, then opponents of disgust in criminal law will be hard 
pressed to prove that disgust should be extricated, as opposed to 
merely constrained and tested by other sentiments such as mercy. I 
will also take up the question whether the coiinection between dis­
gust and hierarchy makes disgust an illegitimate guide for criminal­
law decisionmaking within a liberal political regime. 
A. Disgust and Cruelty 
Miller's strongest normative claim - that we cannot "put cru­
elty first among vices" without regarding disgust as a moral virtue 
(p. 202) - is also the most contentious. In every case in which 
disgust exhorts us to lash out at cruelty, won't we have additional 
sufficient reasons to punish? Alternatively, if all we have to go on 
108. See Co=onwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (recount­
ing Carr's evidence of child neglect and prison rape); Thao Hua, supra note 57, at Bl (report­
ing defense evidence that Lindberg suffered from psychosis exacerbated by drug use and had 
been victim of perceived mistreatment while growing up in Japan). 
109. In fact, far from denying the reprehensibility of the offender's conduct, mercy pre­
supposes it. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 367-71. Because mercy bears this 
signification, it enables us to withhold the degree of reprobation that our disgust calls for 
without endorsing in any way the wrongdoer's own reprehensible (and, in the view of our 
disgust, potentially contaminating) valuations. Or at least this is the aspiration. 
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is disgust, why should we trust our perception that punishment is 
just? 
The "outrageously vile" cases furnish a tempting, but ultimately 
inadequate, basis of support for Miller's position.11° We might in­
deed wonder about the moral acuity of someone who purported not 
to be sickened by such atrocities. But condemnation in such cases 
is overdetermined: wholly apart from whether they revolt us, kill­
ers who mutilate and torture, who savor the suffering and degrada­
tion of their victims, warrant severe punishment for purposes of 
deterrence and incapacitation. What's more, for many - myself 
included - the lessons that such cases can teach us seem clouded 
by the morally problematic status of the death penalty itself. 
What we need to test Miller's claim, then, is a noncapital case in 
which disgust seems both necessary and sufficient to remark the 
cruelty of an offender's behavior. For this consider the request of 
Dennis Beldotti.111 
Beldotti committed murder to gratify his sadistic sexual appe­
tites. His female victim, strangled and stuffed into trash bags, was 
found in the bathroom of his home. Bruises and cuts covered her 
body. Her nipples had been sliced off. Incisions rimmed her pubic 
area. From Beldotti's bedroom, the police recovered numerous 
nude photographs of the victim: some of.these had belonged to the 
victim and her husband and had apparently been stolen by Beldotti 
from the victim's home; others had been taken 'by Beldotti himself, 
after the victim's death, and showed dildos penetrating her vagina 
and anus.112 Based on these and other facts, the jury found that 
Beldotti's crime reflected "extreme atrocity or cruelty," a factor jus­
tifying life imprisonment without parole.113 
Massachusetts law provides that at the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings the property seized and used in evidence should be 
dealt with in a manner consistent with "the public interest."114 
Beldotti requested that the state return certain items of his to his 
representatives outside of prison. These included "four dildos"; 
"bondage paraphernalia"; "one plastic encased photo of the vic­
tim"; "female undergarments"; "one broken 'Glad Heavy Weight 
Trashbag' box" - presumably the one containing the bags he used 
to wrap his victim; "twenty-four magazines depicting naked pubes­
cent and prepubescent girls and boys"; and scores of pornographic 
tapes and magazines "bearing such titles as 'Tamed & Tortured,' 
110. See supra section IV.C. 
111. See Beldotti v. Co=onwealth, 669 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996). 
112. See Beldott� 669 N.E.2d at 224. 
113. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265 §§ 1-2 (West 1996); Ray Richard, Beldotti Con­
victed in Needham Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1989, at 17. 
114. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 3 (West 1996). 
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'Tit & Body Torture,' and 'Tortured Ladies.'"115 The state opposed 
Beldotti's request on the ground that surrendering these items 
"would justifiably spark outrage, disgust, and incredulity on the 
part of the general public."116 "The overwhelming public interest 
here," the state's attorney argued, "is that they be thrown in the 
trash can where they belong. This has nothing to do with free ex­
pression. It has to do with the degradation of a young woman by a 
depraved individual.''117 
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals agreed. "Although prop­
erty may not be forfeited simply because it is offensive or repug­
nant," the court observed, 
we see a connection between the property that Beldotti seeks to have 
returned to him and the crime he committed. The murder for which 
Beldotti is serving his life-term was particularly gruesome; he photo­
graphed the victim's naked torso after inserting dildos into her vagina .. 
and anus and after sexually mutilating her body. The items that 
Beldotti seeks to have returned to him can be seen as being directly 
related to those acts, as having influenced his behavior, or as being 
relevant to an understanding of the psychological or physical circum­
stances under which the crime was committed.11s 
"In these circumstances," the court concluded "to return the prop­
erty would be would be so offensive to basic concepts of decency 
treasured in a civilized society, that it would undermine the confi­
dence that the public has a right to expect in the criminal justice 
system. "119 
My guess is that this decision will strike nearly everyone as in­
disputably correct. What I want to argue is that there is in fact no 
viable basis for that intuition other than the one the court gave -
namely, the disgustingness of Beldotti's request. 
What other rationale could there be? The idea that possession 
of such items would undermine Beldotti's "rehabilitation" makes 
no sense, insofar as he was serving a term of life without parole. 
Perhaps inmates shouldn't be allowed to possess such materials, all 
of which could cause disruption inside a prison, and some of which 
could actually be used to torture other prisoners. But Beldotti 
sought to have the materials released only to his representatives 
outside of prison; whether Beldotti himself could have taken pos­
session of the items, the court recognized, was a separate issue that 
115. Beldotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225. 
116. 669 N.E.2d at 225. 
117. Patricia Nealon, X-Rated Materials Held by Court Sought, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 
1992, at 21 (quoting district attorney). 
118. Beldotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225. 
119. Be/dotti, 669 N.E.2d at 225. 
May 1998] Disgust 1651 
would have had to have been addressed in the first instance by 
prison administrators.120 
It might be thought that no one - in or outside of prison -
should be allowed to possess legally obscene materials. But 
preventing the consumption of obscenity would hardly be a disgust­
neutral ground for the decision. What's more, as the court recog­
nized, the mere possession of the seized magazines and tapes, as 
opposed to the distribution of them, would not have violated state 
law.121 
Forfeiture of the property might be defended as a punitive mea­
sure aimed at promoting general deterrence. But deterrence 
doesn't explain why Beldotti should be made to forfeit these partic­
ular articles rather than some others. Assume that imposition of a 
fine of a certain size could deter as effectively as the forfeiture of 
Beldotti's dildos and trashbags, his picture of the victim, and his 
"Tit & Body Torture" magazines and tapes. Would it then be ac­
ceptable - morally - to let Beldotti have his toys after all in ex­
change for a payment of that amount? If the answer is no, 
deterrence can't be the reason why. What grounds do we have, 
anyway, for thinking that the forfeiture of Beldotti's property adds 
any marginal deterrence to that achieved by sentencing him to life 
imprisonment without parole? If our confidence in the intuition 
that Beldotti was correctly decided outstrips our access to the em­
pirics that would substantiate the deterrent benefits of forfeiture of 
his property, then something else besides deterrence explains the 
intuition. 
That something is disgust. As the court recognized, the items 
Beldotti wanted bore the unmistakable aura of his crime. Bureau­
cratically processing his request - treating it as if it were no more 
remarkable than a claim for a stolen wallet or an impounded auto­
mobile - would have trivialized the unfathomable cruelty of his 
deeds. Indeed, because the atrocity of his crime consisted largely in 
the satisfaction he took in defiling his victim, restoring these items 
to his control, and thereby facilitating even his vicarious enjoyment 
of them, would have allowed Beldotti, as the state argued, to con­
tinue degrading her after death. By connecting the denial of 
Beldotti's request to "public confidence" in the law, moreover, the 
court recognized that enabling Beldotti to satisfy his tastes would 
inevitably have made the state itself complicit in his depravity. The 
only way to avoid being tainted by his request was to throw 
Beldotti's misogynistic magazines and his trash bags and his dildos 
and his kiddy porn "in the trash can where they belong" - rhetori-
120. See Beldotti, 699 N.E.2d at 224. 
121. See Beldotti, 699 N.E.2d at 224. 
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cally, if not literally. All of these motivations and thoughts are na­
tive to disgust as an evaluative sentiment. 
I don't mean to exaggerate the significance of this analysis. Ob­
viously, showing the indispensability of disgust to the result in one 
case doesn't prove Miller's claim that disgust is essential to our per­
ception of, and opposition to, cruelty. But I do see Beldotti as an 
appropriate challenge to put to those who might advocate a disgust­
free conception of criminal law. In effect, it turns the questions 
with which I started this section completely around: What besides 
disgust (and "just so" stories) can really explain the perception that 
granting his request would be wrong? And if nothing else does, 
what could possibly justify committing ourselves to a regime that 
quiets so urgent a moral instinct? 
B. Disgust and !!liberalism 
One answer might be liberalism. Disgust is constructed by and 
reinforces status norms. It does not merely condemn, but also re­
marks the lowness and inferiority of its object. As Miller himself 
recognizes, such sensibilities are marred by their disreputable his­
tory, having been used to "maintain brutal and indefensible re­
gimes" (p. 202) - misogynistic, racist, classist, and homophobic 
ones, among others. Opposition to such rankings motivates mod­
ern liberalism, which is naturally suspicious of disgust. Indeed, 
Miller credits the declining prominence of disgust in our moral dis­
course to "[a] newer style of moralist, . . .  one for whom tolerance 
and respect for persons are fundamental virtues" and who therefore 
"wish[ es] our disgust sensitivities lowered so we would be less sus­
ceptible to finding difference and strangeness sources of disgust. "122 
The insights of liberalism give us just as much reason to be sus­
picious of disgust in criminal law, where, as Bernardski reminds us, 
its role has often been just as brutal and indefensible as it has else­
where. Nevertheless, drawing on the conservation thesis, I want to 
suggest that renouncing the guidance of disgust in criminal law 
would in fact defeat, rather than advance, liberal ends. 
The strongest version of this argument objects on principle to 
the perceived opposition between liberalism and hierarchy. It's 
true that liberal regimes renounce (at least in theory) rankings of a 
particular sort - such as those based on race, gender, and class -
but they haven't renounced all perceptions of high and low, noble 
and base, worthy and unworthy. Even egalitarians hold pedophiles 
and sadists in low esteem, for example, not just because such per­
sons threaten physical harm, but because their values reveal them 
122. P. 179. For a critique of Miller along exactly these lines, see Nussbaum, supra note 
28. 
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to be despicable. Indeed, as Miller points out, those who seek to 
raise the status of historically subordinated groups seek to reshape 
our "emotional economy" so that we'll come to see racists, sexists, 
and homophobes, among others, as debased in exactly the same 
way (p. 235). On this account, the proper course for liberalism is 
.not to obliterate disgust, but to reform its objects so that we come 
to value what is genuinely high, to despise what is genuinely low. 
The criminal law has traditionally been seen as performing a 
"moral educative" function of this sort.123 Punishment is thought to 
discourage criminality not only by raising the "price" of such mis­
conduct, but also by instilling aversions to it.124 It's no surprise that 
legal moralizing of this sort has been, and continues to be, an instru­
ment of "brutal and indefensible regimes." But why should the 
proponents of defensible regimes declare a unilateral cease-fire 
rather than fighting the indefensible ones on their own terms? Er­
ecting a liberal counter-regime of disgust, I've tried to show, is ex­
actly the aim behind "hate crime" laws, which seek to make the 
proponents of illiberal species of hierarchy the object of our revul­
sion. It seems unlikely that a philosophical abstraction as malleable 
as "liberalism" is conceptually incompatible with this form of legal 
moralizing.125 But if it is, so much the worse for liberalism. 
This is, as I've indicated, the strongest response to the liberal 
critique of disgust in criminal law; I want to lay more emphasis, 
however, on a weaker and more pragmatic rejoinder. This position 
views liberal opposition to disgust not as defective in principle, but 
as self-deluding and self-defeating in practice. Styles of criminal­
law theorizing that purport to dispense with disgust do nothing in 
reality to mute its influence. They do, however, disguise it, and in 
so doing prolong the life of outmoded and illiberal norms in the 
law. 
The dominant forms of criminal law theory both have liberal 
antecedents. Voluntarism, which derives from Kantian moral phi­
losophy, treats punishment as justified if, and to the extent that, the 
offender's behavior stems from choice.126 Consequentialism, which 
derives from utilitarian theory, views punishment as warranted if, 
and to the extent that, visiting suffering on the offender promotes 
123. See, e.g., Johs Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sa. 176, 179 {1952); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory 
of Punishment, 13 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 {1984). 
124. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as Prefer­
ence-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1. 
125. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 359-62. 
126. The most influential voluntarist account is that of H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART, 
PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 46- 49 (1968). 
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desired states of affairs.127 Consistent with the liberal bias against 
public moralizing, both theories reflect the mechanistic rather than 
the evaluative conception of emotion, and thus assign no normative 
significance to the valuations that construct disgust sensibilities.128 
Neither theory, however, has succeeded in banishing such evalu­
ations from the law. Voluntarism seeks to "lower" our "disgust sen­
sitivities" by making excuses depend not on the quality of 
offenders' emotional evaluations but rather on the destructive ef­
fect of emotions (or "impulses") on offenders' choice capacities; its 
focus is not on who is too virtuous, but on who is too sick to be 
punished. Yet juries are notoriously resistant to excusing mentally 
unbalanced offenders who commit heinous crimes, no matter how 
obvious the origins of such behavior in pathology:129 "[t]he mud­
dle-headed reformers who seek to make crime a matter of illness 
rather than culpable intention," Miller writes, "fail to realize that 
we do not cease blaming just because someone is sick" (p. 203). At 
the same time, if we insist that decisionmakers speak in a mechanis­
tic rather than an evaluative idiom, then we can expect them to 
describe as "sick" the offenders who are too virtuous to be held 
accountable for their crimes. Consider the historic use of the "irre­
sistible impulse" conception of insanity as a vehicle for excusing all 
manner of virtuous outlaws, from the cuckold to the battered 
woman.130 And if their disgust sensibilities tell decisionmakers that 
a particular offender, such as the homophobe, deserves solicitude, 
we can expect them to see him as excusably "sick," too, a lesson 
taught to us by the selective receptivity of the law to the "homosex­
ual panic" defense.131 
The same story can be told about consequentialism. It attempts 
to suppress evaluative appraisals by connecting excuse to the rela­
tive dangerousness of an impassioned or impulsive offender.132 But 
which impassioned offenders juries and judges see as dangerous 
127. This is the position associated with Jeremy Bentham, see Jeremy Bentham, An Intro­
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 162 
(1961), and his successors, see, e.g., Becker, supra note 66; Posner, An Economic Theory of 
the Criminal Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985). 
128. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 301-05; see also Claire 0. Finkelstein, 
Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense Jn Law, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 251 (1995) (dis­
cussing "voluntarist" and "welfarist" theories of criminal law). 
129. Empirical evidence, for example, suggests that juries, no matter how instructed on 
the definition of insanity, give little weight to the condition of the defendant's psyche and 
focus instead on a cluster of factors relevant to his culpability. See, e.g., Norman J. Fmkel & 
Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe "Insanity," 13 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 41, 57 (1989); 
James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 521, 526 (1991). 
130. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 345-50. 
131. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 
II, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1262, 1280-82 (1937). 
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necessarily depends on which victims they see as valuable enough 
to be protected from harm: cuckolds/battered women aren't all 
that dangerous, unless one ·happens to be a paramour/tyrannical 
man.133 And if disgust sensibilities tell "the decisionmaker that 
homosexuals are worth little, then that decisionmaker will predict­
ably see the killing of one as a "one-time tragedy" committed by an 
otherwise normal person who the decisionmaker can be "confident 
. . .  w[ill] not kill again."134 
In short, the criminal-law theories associated with modern liber­
alism don't genuinely purge the law of disgust. They only push dis­
gust down below the surface of law, where its influence is harder to 
detect. 
And that's bad. It should be clear that there's-no way to guaran­
tee that decisionmakers will be guided by liberal rather than illib­
eral disgust sensibilities. But their sensibilities are likely to deviate 
least from the moral ideal when the evaluations they embody are 
most fully exposed to view. The prospect of publicly owning up to 
reliance on anachronistic or illib�ral disgust sensibilities can itself 
shame decisionmakers into deciding on some other basis. Even 
more important, when we force decisionmakers to be open about 
the normative commitments that underlie their disgust sensibilities, 
members of the public are fully appraised of what those commit­
ments are. This outcome facilitates the kind of self-conscious com­
petition between liberal and illiberal conceptions of disgust, and 
between disgust and other moral sentiments, that is essential to re­
deeming disgust under the moral ambivalence thesis. 
To illustrate, return once more to Bernardski.135 The judge's 
conclusion that the lives of Bernardski's gay victims just weren't 
worth enough to justify a sentence of life imprisonment was outra­
geous - indeed, disgusting. And it provoked public disgust. The 
judge was formally censured for his remarks anq thereafter de­
feated in an election in which the support of women and gays for 
the judge's opponent turned out to be decisive.136 In the wake of 
this and other incidents, moreover, the Texas legislature enacted a 
hate crimes statute that expressly enhances the penalty for crimes 
motivated by bias against any group.137 Had the judge cloaked his 
133. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 19, at 311-12. 
134. See Steven Hunt, Victim's Family, Gays Say Killer Got Off Too Easy, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Aug. 16, 1997, at Cl; Judge Draws Protest After Cutting Sentence of Gay Man's Killer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at A15 (reporting the comments of a judge explaining the lenient 
sentence for a man who hunted down and then shot between the eyes a gay man who had 
earlier propositioned him). 
135. See supra notes .10-17 and accompanying text. 
136. See Lisa Belkin, Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
4, 1992, at B20, col. 5. 
137. See TEX. PENAL CooE ANN. § 12.47 (West 1994); TEX. CooE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 
42.014 (West Supp. 1997); see also Clay Robison, Richards signs hate crimes bill into law, 
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disgust in the rhetoric of voluntarism or consequentialism, it's very 
unlikely that his_ .decision would have furnished so salient a focal 
point for rooting out the illiberal sensibilities that the judge's deci­
sion embodied. 
To Miller's four theses, we can now add a fifth: the self-delusion 
thesis. As one might surmise from the conservation thesis, the kind 
of hierarchic rankings characteristic of disgust are too durable to be 
driven from the scene by the morally antiseptic idiom of liberalism. 
Those who believe otherwise are fooling themselves. If we let them 
fool us, those of us who oppose brutal and indefensible hierarchies 
in law risk becoming their unwitting defenders. 
VI. SEEING DISGUST IN CRIMINAL LAW 
My goal in this review was to suggest the value of Miller's work 
for remedying the blindness of criminal law theory to disgust. I'll 
now take stock of some of the things that his account allows us to 
see. 
For Miller, disgust is not an instinctive and unthinking aversion 
but rather a thought-pervaded evaluative sentiment. Disgust em­
bodies the appraisal that its object is low and contaminating and the 
judgment that we must insulate ourselves from it lest it compromise 
our own status. By feeling and expressing disgust, we thus reinforce 
the hierarchical social norms that give disgust its evaluative content. 
Armed with thi_s account, I've argued,' we can make sense of a 
range of issues that seem anomalous under the conventional theo­
ries of criminal law. Why, for example, is the law of two minds on 
homophobic violence? The answer is that society is of two minds 
on what we should regard as low and contaminating - homosexu­
ality or homophobia. Indeed, I've argued that the "hate crimes" 
debate is better understood as a "disgust crimes" debate, in which 
adherents of competing conceptions of virtue war for control over 
the law's expressive capital. 
Why do citizens stubbornly resist the use of fines and commu­
nity service despite the efficiency of such penalties for nonviolent 
crimes? At least part of the answer is that the social meaning of 
these penalties render them less effective than prison in remarking 
the low status of criminals and in cordoning them off, literally and 
symbolically, from the rest of us. Because shaming penalties, in 
contrast, do unambiguously express disgust, they encounter much 
less political resistance as an alternative to imprisonment. 
Hous. CHRoN., June 20, 1993, State section, at 3 (noting that the purpose of the legislation is 
to enhance "criminal offenses motivated by the victims' race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orien­
tation or national origin"). 
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Why does the "horribly vile" standard persist as a staple of capi­
tal sentencing, notwithstanding- ·its incurable :vagueness? The an­
swer is the necessity of disgust for perceiving and motivating 
opposition to cruelty. At the same time, the law's consciousness of 
the power of disgust to overshoot the mark -. to condemn individ­
uals for defects of character that they cannot control - enjoins the 
law to check disgust with mercy, thereby reproducing in doctrine an 
irreconcilable conflict that exists within our own moral sentiments. 
Miller's account also helps us to frame important normative 
questions about the role of disgust in criminal law. Miller is ambiv­
alent about disgust. He recognizes the historical contribution that 
disgust has made to reinforcing unjust hierarchies, from racism to 
misogyny. But at the same time, he suggests. that no abstract the­
ory, and no other moral sentiment, can reproduce the work that 
disgust does in voicing our opposition to moral atrocities. Miller 
counsels us not to dispel the tension between disgust and other 
moral norms, but to embrace it through evaluative appraisals that 
pit disgust against other moral sentiments. I've argued that the 
same tension pervades the role of disgust in criminal law, and that 
we should try to resolve it in a similar way - that is, not by oppos­
ing disgust per se, but by opposing disgust to other sentiments such 
as mercy, and by opposing unjust forms of disgust with just ones. 
Finally, Miller helps us to see why the dominant theories of 
criminal law have so little to say about the prominence of judg­
ments of and about disgust. This inattention, I've suggested, is not 
so much an oversight as a strategy. The dominant theories of crimi­
nal law are aligned with a style of moral theorizing thatis suspicious 
of disgust because of its origin in hierarchy and its indifference to 
individual autonomy. By directing our· attention to other grounds 
for determining the law's content, the dominant theories attempt to 
distract us from disgust, and thus to blunt the illiberal influence of 
that sentiment on our institutions. 
As well-intentioned as this strategy might be, however, it is ulti­
mately self-defeating. Ignoring disgust does nothing to counteract 
the force that that sentiment exerts over our moral imaginations. 
Indeed, dispensing with disgust leaves theory without the rhetorical 
resources to oppose the forces of illiberalism, to whom the hierar­
chic and intolerant idiom of disgust is no embarrassment. 
In short, the hear-no-, see-no-, speak-no-disgust strategy makes 
theory politically impotent as well as morally obtuse. Miller's ac­
count is the perfect antidote. 
